Quick reference
Cutting your own access
- You deny 0.0.0.0/0 and lose SSH mid-edit
- Keep a console outside the rules you change
- Test the rule from the management subnet
- Out-of-band access is the real control
Locking a shared account
- The build account serves four teams
- Disabling it stops every pipeline at once
- Disable the person, rotate the shared secret
- Hold the shared account for its owner
Blocking a CDN IP
- One edge address serves a thousand customers
- A /32 block is a shared outage
- Check the ASN and the allow rules first
- Block the path or the session, not the CDN
Killing the wrong flag
- Two flags gate the same checkout path
- The kill switch is not the rollback
- Pull the flag with an owner and a default
- Rehearse the off state in a drill
Note: A containment step fails when it removes the path you need to finish it.
Explained
Cutting your own access
You paste a deny rule for 0.0.0.0/0, the SSH session dies mid-edit, and the host is a black hole with a pager. The fix is a management path outside the rules you are changing: a console, a jump host on another subnet, or an out-of-band card.
Locking a shared account
The build account carries four teams' pipelines. Disabling it stops every deploy at once, and the incident becomes a delivery outage. Disable the person's account, rotate the shared secret, and hold the shared account for its owner.
Blocking a CDN IP
One edge address serves a thousand customers. A /32 block looks precise and takes a slice of the internet with it. Check the ASN, the allow rules and the hostnames behind the address before the block.
Killing the wrong flag
Two flags gate the same checkout path, and the friendly name is not the one that controls the failure. Pull the flag with an owner and a default, and rehearse the off state in staging.
The honest caveat: every one of these is cheap to discover in a drill and expensive to discover at 03:00.
The lesson: containment removes a path, and the path you remove is sometimes your own.
In one line
Contain the blast, not the response. Every failed containment is a control that was never tried in a drill.
Try it in a drill
nft -c -f quarantine.nftMore notes: Incident response & detection
Open in the notes app: search, filters, copy This note on GitHub